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We use data from the Current Population Survey collected both before and after 
Hurricane Katrina to estimate the impact of Katrina on the labor market outcomes of evacuees.  
Our estimates are based on a difference-in-differences strategy that compares evacuees to all 
residents of Katrina-affected areas prior to Katrina, with a control group consisting of individuals 
who originally resided outside the areas affected by the storm.  We estimate that Katrina had 
substantial effects on the labor market outcomes of evacuees over the 13-month period 
immediately following Katrina.  However, our estimates suggest that the effects of Katrina 
diminished substantially over time as evacuees recovered from the hurricane and adjusted to new 
economic and social conditions.  Evacuees who did not return to their pre-Katrina areas have 
fared much worse in the labor market than have those who returned.  Differences in individual 
and family characteristics account for some of the differences in outcomes between returnees and 
non-returnees.  We present evidence that non-returnees have fared much worse in the labor 
market primarily because they came from areas that experienced greater housing damage due to 
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of this paper will be published in the American Economic Review in May 2008.   1
1.  Introduction 
Hurricane Katrina, which struck the Gulf Coast in August 2005, was one of the largest 
and most deadly storms in U.S. history.  The massive cyclone caused catastrophic flooding in the 
city of New Orleans and devastating damage along the Gulf coasts of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana.  As a result, Katrina caused a massive relocation of people and created a large amount 
of job displacement.  The number of mass layoff events in Louisiana and Mississippi rose 
sharply in September 2005 following Katrina (Brown and Carey 2006).  In the two months 
following Katrina, payroll employment declined by 35 percent in the New Orleans metropolitan 
area and declined by 12 percent in the entire state of Louisiana (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2006). 
The literature on job displacement suggests that evacuees who were separated from their 
jobs would experience a period of unemployment and, even after finding a new job, long-term 
earnings losses (e.g., Kletzer 1998).  In addition to being displaced from their jobs, many 
evacuees had to relocate to new areas, which disrupted their social networks and placed them in 
unfamiliar labor markets.  Many of those who returned to their pre-Katrina areas had to deal with 
extensive damage to their homes and to public infrastructure (e.g., roads, transit systems, 
schools).  As a result, evacuees may have faced higher costs of searching for a new job than is 
typical for displaced workers.
1  Furthermore, the hurricane and/or the evacuation may have had 
direct effects on the physical and emotional health and general well-being of evacuees. 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of Katrina on the labor market outcomes of 
evacuees.  We also compare the labor market outcomes of evacuees who returned to their pre-
Katrina areas with those of evacuees who did not return. 
                                                 
1 However, many employers in several cities where evacuees relocated made special efforts to hire evacuees (Ilan 
Brat and Janet Adamy, “Job Outpouring for Evacuees Sparks Backlash,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2005, 
p. B1).   2
2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our analysis is based on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a nationally 
representative, monthly survey of approximately 60,000 occupied housing units.  The CPS was 
modified in the wake of Hurricane Katrina to include questions that identify evacuees, the county 
(or parish) from which they had evacuated, and if and when these individuals returned to their 
pre-Katrina residences (Cahoon et al. 2006).  We use the responses to these questions, which 
were part of the CPS from October 2005 to October 2006, in combination with demographic and 
labor force information collected in the CPS on a regular basis.
2 
The battery of Katrina questions opens with a question for the respondent for each 
household: “Is there anyone living or staying here who had to evacuate, even temporarily, where 
he or she was living in August because of Hurricane Katrina?”  If the answer is “yes” the 
respondent identifies who among those listed as being at the current address is an evacuee.  The 
respondent is then asked about the pre-Katrina location of each evacuee using the question: “In 
August, prior to the hurricane warning, where (was NAME/were you) living?”  Pre-Katrina 
locations are recorded in terms of state and county, parish, or city.  The current location of each 
household can be obtained directly from the sample frame.
3 
We define an evacuee as anyone who was identified as such in any of the months that his 
or her household was interviewed.  In addition, to more carefully focus our analysis on those 
directly affected by Hurricane Katrina we require that prior to the hurricane evacuees lived in 
Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama in a county designated by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) as eligible for both public and individual disaster assistance as a 
result of damages due to Hurricane Katrina.  The region formed by the FEMA-designated 
                                                 
2 Labor force information is collected in the CPS from persons age 16 and older; the estimates reported in this paper 
correspond to this age range. 
3 The complete set of Katrina questions is documented in Cahoon et al. (2006) and Groen and Polivka (2007).   3
counties is indicated by darker shading in Figure 1.  (For details on this definition of evacuees, 
see Groen and Polivka 2007.) 
As explained in an earlier paper (Groen and Polivka 2007), the estimates we derive from 
the CPS indicate that approximately 1.5 million individuals age 16 and older evacuated from 
their homes, even temporarily, because of Hurricane Katrina.  We estimate that 75 percent of 
evacuees were living in Louisiana prior to the storm, 19 percent were living in Mississippi, and 6 
percent were living in Alabama.  The evacuation was widespread: the demographic composition 
of evacuees closely mirrors the composition of those residing in the Katrina-affected counties in 
these states prior to the storm. 
On average over the entire post-Katrina period covered by our CPS data, the labor market 
outcomes of evacuees were substantially worse than the outcomes of individuals residing in 
areas of the United States that were not affected by Katrina and who are not classified as 
evacuees (Table 1).  For example, the employment-population ratio was 11.5 percentage points 
lower for evacuees and the unemployment rate was 7.4 percentage points higher for evacuees.  
Reflecting the lower level of employment, an examination of all individuals (workers and non-
workers) indicates that evacuees on average worked about 4 fewer hours per week than residents 
of unaffected areas and earned approximately $120 less per week.  Among just those who were 
employed after the storm, evacuees worked slightly more hours per week on average than did 
residents of unaffected areas but had lower earnings.
4 
Among evacuees, we distinguish between returnees (those living in the same county after 
the storm as they did prior to Katrina) and non-returnees (those living in a different county).  
Over the 13-month period covered by the CPS data on evacuees, we estimate that 73 percent of 
                                                 
4 Earnings data are collected monthly in the CPS from approximately one-fourth of the sample.   4
evacuees returned to their pre-Katrina counties.
5  When we compare non-returnees to returnees 
we observe that non-returnees were doing substantially worse than returnees in the labor market.  
Notably, the unemployment rate for non-returnees was 30.6 percent compared to 6.0 percent for 
returnees.  Among those individuals who worked after the storm, however, returnees and non-
returnees were similar in terms of average hours and earnings. 
The adverse labor market outcomes for evacuees may partially reflect the fact that 
evacuees had relatively poor employment situations prior to the storm.  Consequently, in the 
remainder of the paper we use CPS data collected prior to Katrina in combination with the data 
collected after Katrina.  In the pre-Katrina data, which cover the period from September 2004 to 
August 2005, we divide the data into two groups: residents of affected areas (the FEMA-
designated counties) and residents of the rest of the country.
6  Our pre-Katrina data contain 
22,124 monthly observations covering 6,883 residents of affected areas and 1,255,409 monthly 
observations covering 393,438 residents of the rest of the country.  The post-Katrina data contain 
6,550 monthly observations on 2,033 evacuees and 1,350,294 monthly observations on 406,676 
individuals residing in the rest of the country and who are not classified as evacuees.
7 
3.   The Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Evacuees 
3.1 Empirical Strategy 
The challenge to estimating the effect of Katrina on the labor market outcomes of 
evacuees is the lack of information on what the outcomes for evacuees would have been in the 
                                                 
5 By contrast, 65 percent of evacuees returned to their pre-Katrina residence.  We define returning based on county 
in this paper because those who changed residences within county are likely to face similar labor market 
opportunities as if they had returned to their pre-Katrina residence. 
6 The August 2005 CPS interviews were conducted from August 14 (Sunday) through August 22 (Tuesday), which 
was prior to the mandatory evacuations of Gulf Coast areas that were ordered on August 27 and August 28
 and prior 
to Katrina making landfall in New Orleans on August 29. 
7 Given the months we selected to generate pre-Katrina estimates, the time period when the Katrina questions were 
included in the CPS, and the interview schedule for CPS households (see footnote 8), the maximum number of 
monthly observations for individuals in our sample is four in the pre-Katrina period and five in the post-Katrina 
period.  In the regression estimates, we adjust the standard errors to account for multiple observations per individual.   5
absence of the storm.  Since the CPS sample is based on addresses and the monthly survey is 
designed as a short panel and collects a limited amount of longitudinal information, we do not 
know what most of the evacuees in our sample were doing prior to the storm.
8  However, we do 
know what residents of the Katrina-affected areas were doing prior to Katrina.  Our strategy is to 
compare evacuees to all residents of Katrina-affected areas prior to Katrina.  We use pre- and 
post-Katrina data on residents of unaffected areas to control for economy-wide changes in the 
labor market before and after the storm.
9 
We form “treatment” and “control” groups and compare changes over time in the 
treatment group (individuals affected by Katrina) to changes over time in the control group 
(individuals unaffected by Katrina).  Prior to the storm, the treatment group consists of residents 
of affected areas and the control group consists of residents of the rest of the country.  After the 
storm, the treatment group consists of evacuees (regardless of where they are living) and the 
control group consists of residents of the rest of the country who are not classified as evacuees.  
We define the control group using the entire unaffected area (rather than a particular region) in 
order to minimize the influence of the indirect effects of Katrina on individuals who resided at 
the time of the storm in unaffected areas close to the affected areas.
10   
Summary statistics on a variety of individual and family characteristics are presented in 
Table 2 separately for each of the four groups.  Evacuees and pre-Katrina residents of affected 
                                                 
8 The CPS uses a 4-8-4 sample design in which an address is scheduled to be interviewed for four consecutive 
months, not interviewed for the next eight consecutive months, and then interviewed again for the subsequent four 
months.  Each calendar month a new group of residential addresses starts this rotation pattern.  No attempts are 
made to interview individuals or households that move away from an address.  Given this rotation pattern and the 
fact that the CPS is address-based, pre-storm labor market information that can be obtained by matching individuals 
before and after the storm is available for only a subset of evacuees who returned to their pre-storm addresses and is 
completely absent for evacuees who did not return to their pre-storm addresses (even if they returned to their pre-
storm counties).  The CPS collects only limited longitudinal information which does not typically include calendar 
dates for starting and stopping times of events. 
9 This strategy is similar to the approach taken by Vigdor (2007). 
10 Katrina might have affected such individuals through, for example, linkages to industries that were prominent in 
the Gulf Coast region (e.g., petroleum refining, port operations, and tourism, including casinos; see Dolfman, 
Wasser, and Bergman 2007) or through the migration of evacuees to particular cities (McIntosh 2007).   6
areas are very similar in terms of these characteristics.  In addition, the composition of the 
control group is similar before and after Katrina. 
A potential concern with our strategy is that the racial/ethnic composition of the control 
group is quite different from that of the treatment group.  (For example, prior to the storm 32.5 
percent of the treatment group were black, compared to 11.2 percent of the control group.)  
However, when we re-weight the control group so that its distribution by race/ethnicity matches 
the distribution of the treatment group (prior to the storm), the estimated effects of Katrina we 
obtain are very similar to the ones reported here.  The results are also robust to defining the 
control group based on five southern states (Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida) 
instead of the entire United States outside the affected area.  This definition is appealing because 
the racial/ethnic composition of these states is similar to that of the Katrina-affected area.  
However, these states may have been affected by Katrina indirectly, since most evacuees who 
relocated to another state moved to another state in the southeast region (Groen and Polivka 
2007). 
Finally, as a third robustness check we construct a synthetic control group consisting of a 
weighted average of states, based on the method described in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 
(2007).  To construct this synthetic control group, we first aggregate the micro CPS data to the 
state level and generate one observation for each of the 50 states (and the District of Columbia), 
including observations for Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi for the balance of these states 
outside the hurricane-affected area.  The synthetic control group is then obtained by choosing 
state weights so as to make the synthetic control group as comparable as possible to the treatment 
group prior to Katrina in terms of the distribution of employment outcomes and the individual   7
and family characteristics used in our model.  The results obtained using the synthetic control 
group are similar to results generated using the entire unaffected area to define the control group. 
In our definition of the treatment group we are using evacuation to identify those 
individuals who were directly affected by Katrina.  Another potential concern about our 
approach is that there might be selectivity in who evacuated.  For several reasons we think the 
potential for selectivity to bias our results is limited.  First, our definition of evacuees is broad: it 
includes individuals who relocated temporarily or permanently and those who evacuated before 
or after the storm.  Second, evacuees are representative of all pre-storm residents of affected 
areas.  Third, most evacuees came from areas where most pre-storm residents evacuated.  Nearly 
three-quarters (71 percent) of the evacuees in our sample came from a county along the Gulf 
Coast within 100 miles of the storm center.  Within these counties we estimate that 82 percent of 
pre-storm residents evacuated.  Furthermore, 58 percent of the evacuees in our sample came 
from the New Orleans MSA, for which we estimate the evacuation rate to be 92 percent.
11 
Formally, we implement our difference-in-differences strategy using regressions of the 
form:  
(1)     it it it it it t it Post Treat Treat X Y ε β β θ α + × + + + = ) ( 2 1 , 
where  it Y  indicates an employment outcome of individual i in month/year t.
12  The variable 
it Treat  distinguishes observations in the treatment group from those in the control group.  Time 
effects are represented by  t α , which is a month/year fixed effect, and by  it Post , which indicates 
                                                 
11 To estimate evacuation rates we use pre-Katrina CPS data for June-August 2005 to construct the denominator.  
The New Orleans MSA consists of seven parishes: Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. 
John the Baptist, and St. Tammany.  Counties along the Gulf Coast within 100 miles of the storm center include the 
New Orleans MSA, two additional parishes in Louisiana (Lafourche and Terrebonne), and four counties in 
Mississippi (Hancock, Harrison, Pearl River, and Stone). 
12 The basic results in this section are robust to a number of modifications of equation (1), including (a) replacing the 
month/year fixed effects with a constant term and an indicator for the post-Katrina period, (b) allowing θ to be 
different for treatment and control observations, and (c) using a logit model rather than a linear model in cases 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable.   8
observations in the post-Katrina time period.
13  The coefficient  2 β  measures the impact of 
Katrina on the labor market outcomes of evacuees.  Individual and family characteristics are 
represented by the vector  it X .
14 
3.2 Results 
Estimates of Katrina effects with and without the controls for individual and family 
characteristics are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.  A comparison of these estimates 
indicates that controlling for individual and family characteristics has relatively little impact on 
the estimated effect of Katrina on the various labor market outcomes of evacuees.  When 
individual and family controls are included it is estimated that Katrina lowered the labor force 
participation rate of evacuees by 3.5 percentage points, lowered the employment-population ratio 
by 7.1 percentage points, and raised the unemployment rate by 6.3 percentage points.
15 
We examine how the Katrina effect varies over the post-Katrina time period by defining a 
linear time trend ( t Time ) that ranges from 0 for the first month of this period to 12 for the last 
month and by including among the explanatory variables an interaction between the time trend 
and the  it it Post Treat ×  variable.  The estimated coefficients on the additional interaction term, 
shown in column (5) of Table 3, indicate that the Katrina effect on labor market outcomes 
                                                 
13 The month/year fixed effects capture the average of a given labor market outcome for the control group in the 
specified month/year. 
14 The characteristics are age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, marital status, number of 
children, and indicators for living in an MSA, having ever served on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces, and 
being born outside the United States.  Each of the controls is measured as a categorical variable with two or more 
categories.  In the regressions we use sets of dummy variables to represent the categories of the control variables.  
The controls with more than two categories are age (nine categories), race (four categories), educational attainment 
(five categories), marital status (three categories), and number of children (four categories).  For a complete list of 
these categories, see Table 2. 
15 These estimates are for persons age 16 and older.  When the sample is restricted to persons age 25 to 64, the 
estimated impacts of Katrina increase somewhat for most outcomes.  The magnitude of these impacts as a 
percentage of the means is similar for the age-restricted sample and the full sample.  A similar finding was observed 
in the comparison of returnees and non-returnees when the sample was restricted to persons age 25 to 64.   9
decreased over time.
16  This is consistent with some aspects of the Katrina impact being 
temporary.  In an enriched specification with month/year dummies replacing the linear time 
trend, monthly estimates of the Katrina effect show a declining pattern over time and the 
estimates for the later months are substantially smaller than the estimates for the earlier months 
of the post-Katrina period (Table 4 and Figure 2).  For example, over the first seven months after 
Katrina struck, we estimate that Katrina increased the unemployment rate of evacuees by 8.1 
percentage points; over the next six months, the estimated impact is 4.6 percentage points. 
An examination of the earnings and hours of all individuals (workers and non-workers) 
indicates that Katrina reduced hours worked by about 2 hours.  Consistent with the trend 
observed for employment, the coefficient on the  t it it Time Post Treat × ×  variable indicates that 
the effect of Katrina on hours worked decreased over time.  When the analysis is restricted to just 
those who were employed, the coefficient estimates indicate that evacuees worked an average of 
1.5 more hours per week and earned approximately $52 more per week after the storm.  The 
larger number of hours worked and higher earnings for evacuees who were employed after the 
storm could reflect either a direct effect of Katrina on hours/earnings for those who were 
employed both before and after the storm (e.g., through an increase in demand for evacuees’ 
services) or that the employment effects of Katrina were greater for those with lower 
hours/earnings prior to Katrina.  Using our specification we cannot distinguish between these 
two possible effects. 
The geographic area affected by Hurricane Katrina, as defined by FEMA designations, is 
quite expansive, covering southern Louisiana, central and southern Mississippi, and 
southwestern Alabama (see Figure 1).  However, the severe damage from Katrina was 
                                                 
16 The coefficient on  it it Post Treat × for this specification is shown in column (4) of Table 3.  This represents the 
effect of Katrina for the first month of the post-Katrina period (October 2005, which is  0 = t Time ).   10
concentrated in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast (Gabe et al. 2005).  We divide the 
affected area into two sub-regions: the New Orleans MSA (from which 58 percent of evacuees 
originated) and the rest of the affected area.  Consistent with the geographic pattern of damages, 
the estimated impacts of Katrina on the employment-population ratio and the unemployment rate 
are much larger for evacuees who came from the New Orleans MSA than for evacuees who 
came from the rest of the affected area, as shown in the top panel of Table 5.
17  Table 5 also 
reports estimates for an alternative division of the affected area: counties along the Gulf Coast 
within 100 miles of the storm center (from which 71 percent of evacuees originated and which 
includes the New Orleans MSA) and the rest of the affected area. 
The Katrina effects we have been estimating reflect the effect of the storm on evacuees.  
A related parameter is the effect of the storm on all pre-storm residents of the affected area, 
regardless of whether they evacuated.  This parameter represents a broader measure of storm 
impact, since pre-storm residents of the affected area may have been affected by Katrina even if 
they did not evacuate from their homes.  We estimate this parameter by redefining our treatment 
group after Katrina to include two sub-groups: (1) evacuees and (2) individuals who are living in 
the affected area but not classified as evacuees.  The second sub-group is included to represent 
pre-storm residents of the affected area who did not evacuate.
18  We provide these “intention to 
treat” estimates for the affected area as a whole and for the two divisions of the affected area. 
                                                 
17 Mechanically, we allow the estimated impacts of Katrina to vary by sub-region by (a) constructing two indicator 
variables: one for the New Orleans MSA and one for the rest of affected area, and (b) interacting each of these 
indicator variables with   it Treat  and  it it Post Treat × .  The estimated coefficient on  it it Post Treat ×  interacted with 
the New Orleans indicator variable provides the effect of Katrina on evacuees from the New Orleans MSA while the 
estimated coefficient on  it it Post Treat ×  interacted with the other indicator variable provides the effect of Katrina on 
evacuees from the rest of the affected area. 
18 There is not an exact correspondence due to migration into or out of the affected area after Katrina by individuals 
who are not classified as evacuees.  However, these migration flows appear to be quite small relative to the number 
of such individuals who remained in the affected area throughout the period spanning Katrina (authors’ analysis of 
data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement, a supplement to the March 2006 CPS that collected 
information on migration over the previous year).   11
The estimated effects on all pre-storm residents are shown in the bottom panel of Table 5.  
For the New Orleans MSA, the estimated effects for all residents are only somewhat smaller than 
the estimated effects for evacuees.  Similarly, the estimated effects for evacuees from counties 
along the Gulf Coast within 100 miles of the storm center and for all residents of this sub-region 
are fairly similar.  The correspondence between the estimates for evacuees and for all residents 
of these two sub-regions is not surprising given the high evacuation rates for the New Orleans 
MSA (92 percent) and for counties along the Gulf Coast within 100 miles of the storm center (82 
percent).   
For the sub-region of counties located in the affected area but outside the New Orleans 
MSA, the estimated effects of Katrina on pre-storm residents as a whole are close to zero, in 
contrast to the generally negative effects on evacuees.  The divergence between the estimates for 
evacuees and for all residents of affected area outside the New Orleans MSA is consistent with 
the low evacuation rate (16 percent) for this sub-region and suggests that the labor market 
outcomes of pre-storm residents (on average) in this sub-region were not negatively affected by 
the storm.  The conclusions are similar when using the alternative division of the affected area 
(involving Gulf Coast counties), though the estimates are less precise due to the smaller sample. 
Since almost three quarters of the evacuees in our data came from counties along the Gulf 
Coast within 100 miles of the storm center, the correspondence between the two sets of estimates 
for this sub-region provides further evidence that selectivity bias probably is not a severe 
problem for our estimates of the effect of Katrina on evacuees from this sub-region specifically 
and on evacuees in general.   12
4.  Comparing Returnees and Non-Returnees 
The estimates in Table 1 indicate considerable differences between evacuees who 
returned to their pre-Katrina areas and those who did not, with non-returnees faring significantly 
worse in the labor market.  These differences raise questions about the factors that have 
influenced these evacuees’ labor market experiences.  Are non-returnees a “negatively selected” 
group of evacuees who had poor labor market outcomes before Katrina?  Alternatively, are the 
differences in labor market outcomes the result of the hurricane impact being greater for non-
returnees than returnees, and thus returnees were on average better able to resume work with 
relatively little interruption?  We explore these questions in two steps.  First, we examine 
differences between returning and non-returning evacuees using a regression framework to 
account for differences in individual and family characteristics between groups.  Second, we 
relate labor market outcomes to the amount of hurricane damage individuals potentially 
experienced. 
4.1 Differences in Individual and Family Characteristics 
For the first step, we define an indicator  it R  for whether evacuees returned to their pre-
Katrina counties and estimate regressions of the form:  
(2)                 it it r it t it R X Y ε β θ α + + + = . 
The coefficient  r β  captures the magnitude of differences between returnees and non-returnees 
with similar observable characteristics.  A comparison of the estimates in columns (2) and (3) of 
Table 6 indicates that differences in individual and family characteristics explain about 25 
percent of the difference in the unemployment rate between those who returned and those who 
did not and about 40 percent of the difference in earnings when those who are not working are 
included with a report of zero earnings.  Differences in characteristics explain only about 10   13
percent of the difference in hours worked and only about 5 percent of the difference in the 
employment-population ratio and cannot explain the difference in the labor force participation 
rate.
19  Thus, while individual and family characteristics can explain some of the differences in 
labor market outcomes between groups, a substantial proportion of the difference cannot be 
explained by these factors. 
When we add to equation (2) the interaction between the linear time trend and the 
returning variable, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term suggest that differences 
between returnees and non-returnees (controlling for individual and family characteristics) did 
not consistently decrease or increase over time (column 5 of Table 6).
20  In an enriched 
specification with month/year dummies replacing the linear time trend, monthly estimates of the 
differences between returnees and non-returnees increased over the first half of the post-Katrina 
period in our data and decreased over the second half (Table 7 and Figure 3).
21  Although both 
groups recovered during the period, the timing of that recovery was different: returnees 
recovered relatively more quickly and non-returnees began to catch up approximately seven 
months after the storm struck (Groen and Polivka 2007).  Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the 
period we study, non-returnees continued to lag behind returnees.  For example, in October 2006 
we estimate that (controlling for individual and family characteristics) non-returnees’ 
employment-population ratio was 15.9 percentage points lower and their unemployment rate was 
9.9 percentage points higher than returnees’. 
                                                 
19 Among those who were employed there are no measurable differences in hours and earnings between returnees 
and non-returnees, both when controls are included and when controls are not included. 
20 The coefficient on the returning variable for this specification is shown in column (4) of Table 6.  This represents 
the difference between returnees and non-returnees in the first month of the post-Katrina period (October 2005, 
which is  0 = t Time ). 
21 When we use a quadratic time trend instead of a linear time trend, the estimated coefficients on the time 
interactions are of the expected sign; however, for the outcomes we examine the coefficients are statistically 
significant (at conventional levels of significance) for only the employment-population ratio.   14
4.2 Differences in Hurricane Impact 
To further explore whether negative selectivity existed and the degree to which evacuees 
may have been differentially affected by the storm, we merge our CPS data with data on the 
extent of hurricane-related housing damage at the county level.  Using data from FEMA on 
damages to real property and personal property not covered by insurance, we construct three 
variables representing the percentage of housing units in each evacuee’s county of origin that 
experienced severe damage, major damage, or minor damage.
22  Averages of these percentages 
separately for returnees and non-returnees in our CPS data are shown in Table 8.  Among non-
returnees, the average percentage of housing units with severe damage is 29.2 percent, compared 
to 6.3 percent among returnees.  Thus, it is likely that non-returnees experienced greater 
hurricane impacts, including greater job displacement. 
We examine the relationship between housing damage and labor market outcomes by 
estimating regressions of the form: 
(3)            it it it it it t it Post Damage Damage X Y ε β β θ α + × + + + = ) ( 2 1 , 
where  it Damage  is a measure of housing damage in the evacuee’s county of origin.  We estimate 
these regressions using post-Katrina data on evacuees and pre-Katrina data on all residents of 
Katrina-affected areas.  Pre-Katrina data are included in the analysis to control for the correlation 
across areas between the extent of hurricane damage and less-favorable labor markets prior to the 
storm.  The coefficient  2 β  is the parameter of interest because it captures the additional 
                                                 
22 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Policy Development and Research, 
“Current Housing Unit Damage Estimates: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,” February 12, 2006.  The estimates 
of housing-unit damage were based on direct inspection of housing units to determine eligibility for FEMA housing 
assistance.  Analysts at HUD categorized the inspection results into three categories: minor damage (less than 
$5,200), major damage (between $5,200 and $30,000), and severe damage (greater than or equal to $30,000).  We 
divided the number of housing units in each category by the total number of housing units in a county (according to 
the 2000 Census) to compute the percentage of housing units in the county that were in each damage category.   15
correlation between damage and labor market outcomes for evacuees relative to pre-Katrina 
residents of affected areas. 
We consider three measures of housing damage and include these measures in separate 
specifications: the percentage with severe damage, the percentage with severe or major damage, 
and the percentage with severe, major, or minor damage.  Since the mechanisms underlying a 
relationship between damage and labor market outcomes might be somewhat different for 
returnees and non-returnees, we vary the sample of evacuees used in these regressions, first using 
all evacuees and then using only returnees or non-returnees.  Among all evacuees, housing 
damage has a strong negative effect on labor market outcomes (Table 9).  For example, a 10 
percentage-point increase in severe damage is associated with a 5.2 percentage-point increase in 
the unemployment rate and a 3.4 percentage-point decrease in the employment-population ratio. 
We interpret these effects of housing damage as reflecting both the overall impact of 
Katrina and the ability of evacuees to find jobs in the Katrina-affected region during the recovery 
period, with the second aspect relevant primarily for returnees.
23  Regressions estimated 
separately for returnees and non-returnees indicate that the impact of damage on the 
employment-population ratio is larger among returnees, but the impact of damage on the 
unemployment rate is larger among non-returnees.  The greater level of damage among non-
returnees can account for about half of the differences in labor market outcomes between 
returnees and non-returnees after controlling for individual and family characteristics.
24 
                                                 
23 For evacuees who did not evacuate until after Katrina struck, these effects might also represent the direct effect of 
Katrina on the health and well-being of evacuees.  In addition to these effects, a higher level of damage could also 
be associated with returnees devoting time and resources to rebuilding their homes rather than working in the labor 
market. 
24 Differences in damage can explain 63 percent of the difference between groups in the unemployment rate, 42 
percent of the difference in the employment-population ratio, and 20 percent of the difference in the labor force 
participation rate.  The difference between returnees and non-returnees in the average percentage of housing units 
with severe damage is 6.3 - 29.2 = -22.9 (Table 8).  Thus, expected differences in labor market outcomes between 
returnees and non-returnees, based on the level of severe damage, are the product of (-22.9) and the estimated   16
The impact of damage on labor market outcomes among non-returnees also provides 
some evidence on the extent to which non-returnees are a “negatively selected” group of 
evacuees.  If such selection were present, we expect that as the level of damage increases, the 
pool of non-returnees would involve less selection and average outcomes would improve.  On 
the contrary, our estimates suggest the opposite: as damage increases, the outcomes of non-
returnees worsen, mainly through higher unemployment.  We interpret this as evidence that non-
returnees have fared much worse in the labor market primarily because they probably 
experienced greater job displacement as evidenced by their origins in areas with more physical 
damage, rather than because of negative selection. 
5.  Conclusions 
CPS data collected after Hurricane Katrina reveal large differences in labor market 
outcomes between evacuees and individuals who were not affected by Katrina.  These 
differences reflect a combination of a causal effect of Katrina on evacuees and pre-Katrina 
differences between evacuees and individuals originally residing outside the areas affected by the 
storm.  Using a difference-in-differences strategy to isolate the causal effect of Katrina, we 
estimate that Katrina had substantial effects on the labor market outcomes of evacuees over the 
13-month period following Katrina.  According to our estimates, Katrina lowered the labor force 
participation rate of evacuees by 3.5 percentage points, lowered the employment-population ratio 
by 7.1 percentage points, and raised the unemployment rate by 6.3 percentage points.   
Our estimates suggest that the effects of Katrina diminished substantially over time as 
evacuees recovered from the hurricane and adjusted to new economic and social conditions.  The 
estimated impacts for the final six months of the post-Katrina period in our data are about 50 
                                                                                                                                                             
coefficients on the variable for severe damage (interacted with  it Post ) for the sample of all evacuees (Table 9).  
These expected differences can be compared to the estimates in column (3) of Table 6.   17
percent of the impacts for the first seven months of this period.  In addition, the estimated 
impacts of Katrina are much larger for evacuees who came from counties along the Gulf Coast 
within 100 miles of the storm center (including the New Orleans MSA) than for evacuees who 
came from the rest of the affected area.  This pattern is consistent with the geographic pattern of 
physical damages brought about by the hurricane. 
Among evacuees, those who did not return to their pre-Katrina areas have fared much 
worse in the labor market than have those who returned.  Differences in individual and family 
characteristics account for some of the differences in outcomes between returnees and non-
returnees.  However, even when these differences are taken into account, non-returnees’ 
unemployment rate was 18.8 percentage points higher and their employment-population ratio 
18.6 percentage points lower than returnees’ over the 13-month period following Katrina.  More 
than one year after the storm (in October 2006), the unemployment rate of non-returnees was still 
9.9 percentage points higher than that of comparable returnees. 
We present evidence that non-returnees came from areas that experienced greater housing 
damage due to the storm and that the level of damage in an evacuee’s county of origin is 
negatively correlated with the labor market outcomes of evacuees (even controlling for more 
heavily damaged areas potentially having less-favorable labor markets prior to the storm).  
Together these findings imply that non-returnees have fared much worse in the labor market 
primarily because they were more likely to have had their lives severely disrupted by the storm. 
Overall our estimates suggest that Hurricane Katrina profoundly disrupted the lives of 
those who evacuated, both those who returned and those who did not.  Our estimates also 
indicate that evacuees who did not return have faced and probably will continue to face large 
challenges in recovering from the storm’s effects.   18
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Figure 1. 
Counties Eligible for Individual and Public Assistance from FEMA for Hurricane Katrina 
 
Louisiana   Mississippi  Alabama 
 
 
Notes: Eligible counties are indicated by darker shading and are based on FEMA disaster declarations for Hurricane 
Katrina as of October 7, 2005.  The set of eligible counties includes 31 parishes in Louisiana, 49 counties in 
Mississippi, and 11 counties in Alabama.  20
Figure 2. 
Monthly Estimates of the Effect of Katrina on Evacuees 
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Figure 3. 
Monthly Estimates of the Difference between Returnees and Non-Returnees 
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Table 1. 












Labor force participation rate  66.2 58.8 60.9 53.4 
Employment-population ratio  63.2 51.7 57.3 37.1 
Unemployment rate  4.7 12.1 6.0 30.6 
Average hours in prior week  23.9 19.9 22.2 13.9 
Hours (workers only)  38.4 39.6 39.6 39.8 
Average usual weekly earnings  $466  $342  $377  $252  
Earnings (workers only)  $772  $685  $683  $695  
Number of observations  1,350,294 6,550 4,769 1,753 
 
Notes: “Residents of unaffected areas” are individuals residing in areas of the United States that were not affected 
by Katrina and who are not classified as evacuees.  Hours and earnings are based on a person’s main job.  Earnings 
are expressed in October 2006 dollars.   23
Table 2. 
Composition of Treatment and Control Groups Before and After Hurricane Katrina 
 
 Treatment Treatment Control Control 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Age 16 to 19  7.5 9.2 7.2 7.3 
Age 20 to 24  10.4 11.0 9.0 8.8 
Age 25 to 34  17.5 17.1 17.3 17.2 
Age 35 to 44  18.0 17.2 19.2 18.8 
Age 45 to 54  18.2 17.7 18.6 18.7 
Age 55 to 69  7.4 8.0 7.5 7.8 
Age 60 to 64  6.0 5.7 5.7 5.8 
Age 65 to 74  8.1 8.4 8.1 8.1 
Age 75+  6.9 5.7 7.4 7.4 
White 65.4 63.3 82.0 81.8 
Black 32.5 32.7 11.2 11.3 
Asian 1.1 2.6 4.4 4.5 
Other race  1.1 1.4 2.4 2.4 
Hispanic 1.7 3.6 13.0 13.3 
Male 46.7 45.5 48.3 48.4 
Less than high school  21.9 21.7 18.6 18.2 
High school  34.1 34.1 30.7 30.5 
Some college  24.4 26.6 26.2 26.4 
College 13.3 12.4 16.3 16.6 
Graduate degree  6.3 5.2 8.2 8.4 
Married 51.7 46.2 54.7 54.3 
Was married  19.2 20.8 17.9 18.0 
Never married  29.0 33.0 27.3 27.6 
0 children  70.7 71.8 70.8 71.1 
1 child  13.4 13.5 12.0 12.0 
2 children  10.5 8.6 11.2 11.0 
3+ children  5.4 6.1 6.0 5.9 
Live in MSA  71.6 84.1 83.6 83.9 
Foreign born  3.0 4.6 14.6 14.9 
Veteran of military  9.2 9.8 9.9 9.9 
Number of observations  22,124 6,550 1,255,409 1,350,294 
 
Note: Means weighted by CPS sampling weights.  For all variables except hours and earnings, the means have been 
multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as percentage points.  “Was married” = widowed, divorced, or 
separated.  Number of children refers to own children under age 18.   24
Table 3. 
Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Labor Market Outcomes of Evacuees 
 















Independent variables         
Treat, Treat×Post    x x x  x   
Month/year  fixed  effects    x x x  x   
Individual and family characteristics      x  x  x   
Treat×Post×Time      x  x   
Dependent variable         
Labor force participation rate  66.09  -3.77  -3.51  -6.39  0.47  2,634,377
    (1.23) (1.06) (1.75)  (0.21)   
Employment-population ratio  62.82  -7.50  -7.06  -11.44  0.72  2,634,377
    (1.25) (1.10) (1.81)  (0.22)   
Unemployment  rate  4.96 6.66 6.26 9.64  -0.54  1,751,687
    (0.90) (0.86) (1.60)  (0.20)   
Hours in prior week  23.74  -2.47  -2.04  -3.44  0.23  2,566,562
    (0.55) (0.47) (0.80)  (0.10)   
Hours (workers only)  38.36  1.16  1.50  2.34  -0.13  1,601,548
    (0.40) (0.37) (0.65)  (0.09)   
Usual weekly earnings  461.87  -26.03  -11.86  -58.81  7.43  614,087
   (16.77) (15.05)  (26.18)  (3.94)   
Earnings (workers only)  769.63  28.45  51.73  37.34  2.19  370,148
    (26.60) (23.63) (39.73) (6.22)  
 
Notes: The numbers reported in columns (2)-(5) are estimated coefficients associated with the variable listed in the 
column heading.  Standard errors in parentheses account for the clustering of observations at the individual level.  
Regressions are estimated as linear models and weighted using CPS sampling weights.  For the first three dependent 
variables, the means, coefficients, and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as 
percentage points.  The sample for these regressions is all individuals in the treatment and control groups before and 
after Katrina, as defined in the text.   25
Table 4. 





















October 2005  -8.07  -14.62  13.47  -5.03  3.40  4.65  73.04 
  (2.57) (2.61) (2.91) (1.23)  (1.29)  (50.87) (61.51) 
November 2005  -5.96  -11.14  9.72  -3.35  2.16  -99.01  79.39 
  (2.19) (2.24) (2.31) (0.97)  (0.89)  (61.74) (120.10) 
December 2005  -4.98  -7.94  5.57  -2.02  2.27  -37.82  20.37 
  (2.09) (2.14) (1.91) (0.95)  (0.85)  (32.58) (50.51) 
January 2006  -4.49  -8.92  8.07  -2.76  1.23  -87.86  -37.09 
  (2.06) (2.08) (2.14) (0.88)  (0.77)  (37.98) (50.20) 
February 2006  -4.46  -6.74  4.29  -1.29  2.53  58.29  144.58 
  (2.11) (2.14) (1.86) (0.92)  (0.78)  (55.96) (83.31) 
March 2006  -5.08  -8.79  7.05  -2.40  1.53  -20.86  -6.81 
  (2.13) (2.17) (2.19) (0.91)  (0.68)  (38.30) (46.37) 
April 2006  -3.98  -8.96  8.75  -2.88  1.36  -79.20  18.71 
  (2.17) (2.25) (2.35) (0.92)  (0.73)  (37.97) (53.75) 
May 2006  -1.73  -6.08  6.78  -1.85  1.05  -75.69  -55.07 
  (1.98) (2.07) (1.98) (0.87)  (0.71)  (34.02) (46.52) 
June 2006  -0.67  -4.41  5.73  -1.78  -0.03  58.45  108.93 
  (1.86) (1.99) (1.85) (0.84)  (0.74)  (43.55) (66.02) 
July 2006  -2.24  -4.42  3.63  -1.54  0.81  -11.18  25.33 
  (1.91) (1.99) (1.67) (0.89)  (0.78)  (37.91) (50.05) 
August 2006  -1.22  -3.94  4.52  -0.43  2.01  76.21  196.84 
  (1.86) (1.99) (1.74) (0.90)  (0.80)  (76.59) (129.03) 
September 2006  -2.42  -3.80  2.65  -0.72  1.30  55.68  55.28 
  (1.95) (2.04) (1.66) (0.92)  (0.87)  (48.61) (75.80) 
October 2006  -1.95  -4.46  4.10  -1.44  0.96  -30.39  -17.19 
  (2.15) (2.25) (1.92) (1.00)  (0.91)  (48.24) (71.35) 
First 7 months (a1)  -5.29  -9.59  8.13  -2.82  2.07  -37.40  41.74 
Last 6 months (a2)  -1.71  -4.52  4.57  -1.29  1.02  12.18  52.35 
Ho  (a1=a2):  F  stat. 5.15 9.43 5.97 4.32  2.92  3.51  0.07 
Ho  (a1=a2):  p-value  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04  0.09  0.06  0.80 
 
Notes: The numbers reported in the table are estimated coefficients associated with the relevant month×Treat×Post 
variable.  Standard errors in parentheses account for the clustering of observations at the individual level.  
Regressions are estimated as linear models and weighted using CPS sampling weights.  For the first three dependent 
variables, the coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as 
percentage points. The sample for these regressions is all individuals in the treatment and control groups before and 
after Katrina, as defined in the text. 
 
a Labor Force Participation Rate
  
b Employment-Population Ratio 
c Unemployment Rate  26
Table 5. 
Effect of Hurricane Katrina by Sub-Region within the Affected Area 
 
  
 Division  involving 
New Orleans 



















Effect on evacuees           
Labor force participation rate  -3.51    -3.61  -3.08    -3.54  -2.85 
  (1.06)  (1.62)  (1.51)  (1.41)  (1.82) 
Employment-population  ratio  -7.06  -9.80  -3.46  -9.04  -2.79 
  (1.10)  (1.70)  (1.55)  (1.49)  (1.85) 
Unemployment  rate  6.26   10.74  0.67  9.57  -0.06 
  (0.86)  (1.38)  (0.87)  (1.16)  (1.02) 
Effect on pre-storm residents           
Labor force participation rate  -0.89    -2.76  -0.44    -2.88  -0.16 
  (0.64)  (1.53)  (0.69)  (1.28)  (0.72) 
Employment-population  ratio  -1.52  -8.22  0.13  -7.35  0.63 
  (0.66)  (1.61)  (0.72)  (1.35)  (0.75) 
Unemployment  rate  1.05  9.23  -0.94  7.60  -1.31 
  (0.44)  (1.26)  (0.44)  (1.00)  (0.47) 
           
Percent of all evacuees  100%    58%  42%    71%  29% 
Evacuation  rate  30%  92%  16%  82%  12% 
 
Notes:  The table contains estimated coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses) that account for the 
clustering of observations at the individual level.  Regressions are estimated as linear models, weighted using CPS 
sampling weights, and include month fixed effects and controls for individual and family characteristics.  The 
coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as percentage points.  
The New Orleans MSA consists of seven parishes: Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. 
John the Baptist, and St. Tammany.  Counties along the Gulf Coast within 100 miles of the storm center include the 
New Orleans MSA, two additional parishes in Louisiana (Lafourche and Terrebonne), and four counties in 
Mississippi (Hancock, Harrison, Pearl River, and Stone). 
 
a Counties along the Gulf Coast within 100 miles of the storm center   27
Table 6. 
Differences in Labor Market Outcomes between Returnees and Non-Returnees 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







Independent variables        
Return   x  x  x  x   
Month/year fixed effects    x  x  x  x   
Individual and family characteristics      x  x  x   
Return×Time     x  x   
Dependent variable        
Labor force participation rate  58.99  6.79  9.37  7.56  0.31  6,429
   (2.51)  (2.28)  (3.81)  (0.50) 
Employment-population ratio  51.85  19.86  18.58  17.49  0.19  6,429
   (2.48)  (2.32)  (3.77)  (0.52) 
Unemployment rate  12.10  -25.06  -18.81  -21.40  0.44  3,764
   (2.69)  (2.29)  (4.08)  (0.59) 
Hours in prior week  20.00  8.20  7.26  7.72  -0.08  6,243
   (1.09)  (1.02)  (1.66)  (0.24) 
Hours (workers only)  39.61  -0.11  0.04  0.90  -0.14  3,159
   (0.97)  (0.85)  (1.54)  (0.22) 
Usual weekly earnings  343.25  113.71  64.49  1.52  10.24  1,520
   (35.70)  (41.84)  (61.58)  (10.52) 
Earnings (workers only)  686.10  -10.02  -102.10  -55.95  -7.42  760
   (75.47)  (78.44)  (114.06)  (21.49) 
 
Notes: The numbers reported in columns (2)-(5) are estimated coefficients associated with the variable listed in the 
column heading.  Standard errors in parentheses account for the clustering of observations at the individual level.  
Regressions are estimated as linear models and weighted using CPS sampling weights.  For the first three dependent 
variables, the means, coefficients, and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as 
percentage points.  The sample for these regressions is all evacuees (using data collected after Katrina).   28
Table 7. 





















October 2005  1.15  12.03  -22.26  7.41  2.52  156.70  160.35 
  (5.25) (5.13) (6.40) (2.40)  (3.23) (101.56)  (101.64) 
November 2005  3.76  12.61  -18.26  4.44  -0.43  -173.30  -420.18 
  (4.88) (4.78) (5.92) (2.05)  (1.93) (140.50)  (322.68) 
December 2005  9.89  15.86  -13.20  6.66  -0.03  103.93  -316.07 
  (4.83) (4.76) (5.44) (2.13)  (2.22)  (75.28) (186.52) 
January 2006  12.26  19.74  -17.60  7.72  0.88  13.20  38.66 
  (4.46) (4.27) (5.47) (1.78)  (1.79)  (71.74) (110.32) 
February 2006  9.70  18.48  -18.03  7.54  0.29  25.75  -60.72 
  (4.89) (4.75) (5.32) (1.95)  (1.73) (105.72)  (160.28) 
March 2006  16.57  29.56  -30.76  11.17  -0.22  116.81  -17.97 
  (4.97) (4.43) (6.12) (1.88)  (1.90)  (98.27) (96.24) 
April 2006  10.97  22.92  -26.27  8.83  1.31  79.40  -151.64 
  (5.02) (4.79) (6.59) (1.97)  (2.51)  (74.68) (158.83) 
May 2006  11.62  22.43  -20.44  8.95  0.08  94.72  -90.84 
  (4.84) (4.80) (5.79) (1.96)  (1.70)  (75.11) (133.79) 
June 2006  8.08  20.24  -21.88  7.47  -1.02  114.35  -160.30 
  (4.77) (4.88) (5.80) (2.12)  (2.61)  (90.78) (123.07) 
July 2006  7.73  18.81  -19.54  6.88  -0.30  216.40  152.53 
  (4.72) (4.84) (5.35) (2.16)  (2.13)  (73.61) (81.57) 
August 2006  6.23  15.31  -14.92  4.99  -0.52  12.80  -510.43 
  (4.30) (4.79) (5.31) (2.20)  (2.01) (237.33)  (486.39) 
September 2006  10.61  15.56  -11.61  5.80  0.16  77.14  -14.44 
  (4.73) (5.02) (5.55) (2.23)  (1.98)  (92.47) (140.53) 
October 2006  12.10  15.92  -9.92  5.48  -1.52  126.80  -31.81 
  (5.69) (5.72) (6.26) (2.58)  (2.65)  (90.01) (140.94) 
First 5 months (a1)  7.35  15.74  -17.87  6.75  0.64  25.26  -119.59 
March 2006 (a2)  16.57  29.56  -30.76  11.17  -0.22  116.81  -17.97 
Last 7 months (a3)  9.62  18.74  -17.80  6.91  -0.26  103.09  -115.28 
Ho  (a1=a2):  F  stat. 3.39 9.16 4.04 4.86  0.17  0.67  0.64 
Ho  (a1=a2):  p-value  0.07 0.00 0.04 0.03  0.68  0.41  0.42 
Ho  (a2=a3):  F  stat. 1.85 5.45 4.24 4.44  0.00  0.01  0.51 
Ho  (a2=a3):  p-value  0.17 0.02 0.04 0.04  0.99  0.90  0.48 
 
Notes: The numbers reported in the table are estimated coefficients associated with the relevant month/year×Return 
variable.  Standard errors in parentheses account for the clustering of individual observations.  Regressions are 
estimated as linear models and weighted using CPS sampling weights.  For the first three dependent variables, the 
coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as percentage points.  
The sample for these regressions is all evacuees (using data collected after Katrina). 
 
a Labor Force Participation Rate 
b Employment-Population Ratio 
c Unemployment Rate  29
Table 8. 







Severe damage  12.4 6.3 29.2
Major damage  14.4 13.8 15.9
Minor damage  30.6 34.0 21.0
No damage  42.7 45.9 33.8
Severe or major  26.7 20.1 45.1
Severe, major, or minor  57.3 54.1 66.2
Number of observations  6,429 4,769 1,660
 
Note: The numbers in the table are averages of the percentage of housing units in the evacuee’s county of origin that 
experienced a given level of damage.   30
Table 9. 




















All evacuees           
Severe  -0.08 -0.34 0.52 -0.15  -0.03  -2.99  -1.87 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.84) (1.21) 
Severe or major  -0.06  -0.24  0.35  -0.11  -0.03  -2.01  -0.74 
  (0.05) (0.09) (0.13) (0.04) (0.02) (0.91) (1.16) 
Severe, major, or minor  -0.03  -0.16  0.23  -0.10  -0.06  -1.75  -1.20 
  (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.05) (0.03) (1.29) (1.51) 
Mean 61.60  57.09  7.32  21.66  38.61  358.26  662.06 
N  28,553 28,553 17,316 27,877  15,446  6,814  3,628 
           
Returnees           
Severe  -0.11 -0.17 0.15 -0.08  -0.02  -4.38  -4.34 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.60) (1.23) 
Severe or major  -0.02  -0.07  0.09  -0.05  -0.04  -2.18  -1.49 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (1.15) (1.56) 
Severe, major, or minor  0.03  0.00  0.04  -0.03  -0.06  -1.60  -2.07 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (1.26) (1.61) 
Mean 62.12  58.42  5.95  22.16  38.57  365.85  660.32 
N  26,893 26,893 16,428 26,271  14,857  6,410  3,475 
           
Non-returnees           
Severe  0.16 -0.09 0.47 -0.06  -0.05  -1.18  -3.98 
  (0.07) (0.11) (0.21) (0.05) (0.03) (1.42) (2.27) 
Severe or major  0.09  -0.08  0.34  -0.05  -0.04  -0.78  -2.28 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.20) (0.05) (0.03) (1.09) (1.91) 
Severe, major, or minor  0.04  -0.16  0.43  -0.10  -0.07  -0.10  -0.13 
  (0.13) (0.15) (0.23) (0.07) (0.05) (0.95) (2.33) 
Mean 61.75  57.06  7.59  21.54  38.42  354.14  657.40 
N  23,784 23,784 14,440 23,240  12,876  5,698  3,021 
 
Notes: The table contains estimated coefficients on the Damage×Post variable and associated standard errors (in 
parentheses) that account for the clustering of observations at the county level.  Each cell is based on a separate 
regression involving the dependent variable listed in the column heading.  Regressions are estimated as linear 
models and weighted using CPS sampling weights.  For the first three dependent variables, the means, coefficients, 
and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 and thus should be interpreted as percentage points.  The sample for 
these regressions is based on pre-Katrina data on all residents of Katrina-affected areas and post-Katrina data on 
evacuees; the sample of evacuees used in a particular regression is indicated in italics in the first column. 
 
a Labor Force Participation Rate 
b Employment-Population Ratio 
c Unemployment Rate 